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1. Introduction 
 A patented innovation provides the innovator opportunities to reap a reward on his or her 
investment in research and development.  For an outside independent research lab, this reward may be 
realized through licensing its innovation to the producing firms.  For an inside firm, it may keep its 
innovation for its own use and gains an advantage in competing with its competitors. It may also license 
the innovation to its competitors. Several important reasons have been advanced in the literature as to 
why a firm may want to license an innovation to its competitors, covering both the profit motive and the 
strategic incentive. For example, Gallini (1984) points out the incentive for an incumbent to license to a 
potential entrant so as to reduce the likelihood of the latter developing a better technology; Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) regard the incentive to license as an integral part of a firm’s R&D decision in evaluating 
the profitability of a R&D project; Eswaran (1994) explores the possibility that licensees can serve as a 
barrier to entry; Lin (1996) shows that licensing in the form of a fixed fee may serve as a facilitating 
device for collusion among competitors. 
 Despite the presence of these and other possible incentives for a firm to license an innovation to 
its competitors, it remains well recognized by economists that licensing of innovations between 
competing firms does not happen very often. The most pronounced explanation for this is the existence 
of asymmetric information. Potential licensees lack detailed information about an innovation to assess its 
value prior to licensing so that they are not willing to pay the desired amount of compensation demanded 
by the patent-holder. Other known reasons include the innovating firm’s unwillingness to share pertinent 
information with competitors that might have bearing on other related and ongoing R&D, and the fact 
that it may be costly or impossible for the licensor to monitor how the potential licensee uses the 
licensed innovation, including the monitoring of its output produced using the licensed innovation and the 
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possibility that it might re-license to other firms.1 The goal of this paper is to point to another potentially 
important reason for the lack of licensing of innovations between competing firms. It has to do with the 
widely recognized fact of separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation and the 
delegation of some decision making from owners to managers. 
 We consider licensing as part of a delegation-licensing-quantity game. Our game involves three 
stages and two competing duopoly firms. The first stage is the delegation stage. In this stage, owners of 
the two firms decide simultaneously incentive contracts for their managers. The second stage of the 
game is the licensing stage in which the patent-holding firm chooses a licensing contract for its innovation 
and the other firm decides whether to accept the contract offer. The third stage is the quantity 
competition stage in which the firms’ managers engage in an output competition. The main result of this 
paper is that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation than under no delegation. 
 The delegation-licensing-quantity game studied here combines two strands of literature. One is 
the strategic delegation literature. The most influential early work in this literature includes Fershtman and 
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). The other is the licensing literature. A seminal paper on technology 
licensing is Arrow (1962). Kamien (1992) contains an excellent review of this literature. A paper closely 
related to the present paper is Saracho (2002), who studies licensing by an independent research lab to 
an oligopoly under strategic delegation. Her model has the same three stages as in our model. Her 
focus, however, is on the comparison of fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing and her main result 
extends the finding in Wang (1998) and Kamien and Tauman (2002) that royalty can be superior to 
fixed fee for the patentee. 
                                                                 
1 See Shapiro (1985) for an account of these reasons. 
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2.  Model Setup 
 The impact of strategic delegation on licensing is most transparent in the context of a 
homogeneous good Cournot duopoly with a linear demand and constant unit cost of production. 
Assume the (inverse) market demand function is given by p = Qa - , where p denotes price and Q 
represents industry output. With the old technology, both firms produce at constant unit production cost 
c (0 < c < a). The cost-reducing innovation by firm 1 creates a new technology that lowers its unit cost 
and any licensee’s unit cost by the amount of e . For simplicity, our focus is on non-drastic innovations 
(i.e., e  < ca - ).2  
Our game takes place in three stages: delegation, licensing, and quantity competition, 
respectively. In the first stage, the firms’ owners decide simultaneously their incentive contract for their 
managers. In the second stage, firm 1 (the patent-holder) chooses a licensing contract and firm 2 
decides whether to accept firm 1’s offer. In the third stage, the firms’ managers simultaneously choose 
their output levels.  
The output choice stage is essentially the standard Cournot game except that the managers are 
not profit maximizers but rather that they maximize a weighted sum of profit and revenue. The delegation 
stage determines the firms’ incentive parameters for their managers, these parameter values determine 
the weights assigned to profit and revenue in the manager’s optimization problem. The values of these 
parameters will depend on the firms’ unit costs of production. That is, the incentive parameters are 
                                                                 
2 An innovation is drastic if the post-innovation monopoly price is equal to or below the pre-innovation competitive 
price. That is, e  ³  ca - . See, for example, Kamien (1992) for definition. As it is well established that a drastic 
innovation will not be licensed to competitors by the patent-holding firm in the case of no delegation (e.g., Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985), in our model with strategic delegation such an innovation will certainly not be licensed. 
 4 
functions of the firms’ cost levels. The actual levels of the firms’ unit costs are determined by the 
licensing stage. To solve the delegation game, one need only find the solution to the last (output) stage of 
the game.3 The payoffs to all participants (both owners and managers) in the three stage game are 
realized in the last stage of the game.  
 
3. The Delegation-Licensing-Quantity Game 
We start by solving the output stage of the three stage game. For convenience, we then move 
on to solve the delegation problem and finally the licensing problem. 
Quantity Competition 
 To study the managers’ output choices in the last stage of the game, we assume that firm 1 has 
an unspecified constant unit production cost of 1c  and firm 2 has an unspecified constant unit production 
cost of 2c . These marginal cost levels will be determined by the first two stages of the game. 
Throughout the paper subscripts 1 and 2 denote for firms 1 and 2, respectively. 
 Firm 1’s profit function is represented by P1  = ( )a q q c q- - -1 2 1 1  and its revenue function is 
1R  = 121 q)qqa( -- . The manager for firm 1 chooses 1q  to maximize a weighted sum of its profit and 
revenue, namely,  
1O  = 1111 R)1( a-+Pa ,         (1) 
where 1a  is the incentive (weight) parameter chosen by firm 1’s owner in the first two stages of the 
game. Similarly, the manager for firm 2 chooses 2q  to maximize  
                                                                 
3 It is implied that one need not solve the second (licensing) stage game first in order to solve the first (delegation) 
stage game. Hence, the order of the first two stages is actually irrelevant to the final solution of the game. 
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2O  = 2222 R)1( a-+Pa ,         (2) 
where 2a  is the incentive parameter chosen by firm 2’s owner in the first two stages of the game, 2P  = 
2221 q)cqqa( ---  and 2R  = 221 q)qqa( --  represent respectively firm 2’s profit and revenue. As in 
Fershtman and Judd (1987), we allow 1a  and 2a  to take any value.  
Maximizing 1O  in (1) with respect to 1q  gives firm 1’s quantity reaction function:  
î
í
ì -a-
=
0
2/)qca(
q 2111     
112
112
caqif
caqif
a->
a-£
      (3) 
Similarly, maximizing 2O  in (2) with respect to 2q  yields firm 2’s quantity reaction function:  
î
í
ì -a-
=
0
2/)qca(
q 1222  
221
221
caqif
caqif
a->
a-£
       (4) 
These reaction functions have the usual interpretation of first-order conditions. That is, a firm’s optimal 
output response is one in which its marginal benefit is equal to marginal cost; and when marginal cost is 
always higher than marginal benefit the firm’s optimal choice of output is zero. 
The intersection of the reaction functions (3) and (4) gives the firms’ equilibrium quantities in the 
third stage of the game as a function of choices made in the first two stages of the game. As in the 
standard Cournot model with unequal marginal costs, the intersection point of the reaction functions may 
be either an interior point with both quantities positive or a boundary point with one firm producing zero. 
In our model, firm 1 as the innovating firm will always be at least as efficient as firm 2 (i.e., 21 cc £ ) and 
the only possible corner solution is where firm 2 produces zero. The third stage output choices as 
functions of choices in the first two stages of the game are summarized in Lemma 1. (Proofs of all 
lemmas and propositions are provided in the appendix.) 
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Lemma 1: Assuming that 2211 cc a£a , the equilibrium output levels in the quantity game in which firm 
i’s manager maximizes iO  (i = 1,2) are  
ïî
ï
í
ì
a-º
a+a-º
=
2/)ca(q
3/)cc2a(q
q
11
c
1
2211
i
1
1     0c2caif
0c2caif
2211
2211
£a-a+
>a-a+
    (5) 
ïî
ï
í
ì
º
a+a-º
=
0q
3/)cc2a(q
q
c
2
1122
i
2
2   0c2caif
0c2caif
2211
2211
£a-a+
>a-a+
    (6) 
 
 By Lemma 1, if 0c2ca 2211 >a-a+  then the third stage quantity game gives an interior 
solution, given by ( i2
i
1 q,q ); and if 0c2ca 2211 £a-a+  then the third stage game gives a corner solution, 
given by ( c2
c
1 q,q ). The assumption 2211 cc a£a  will be verified later on to be satisfied in equilibrium.  
The Delegation Problem 
 In the delegation stage of the game the two firms’ owners simultaneously choose their incentive 
parameters 1a  and 2a , knowing that the solution for the output stage of the game will be given 
according to Lemma 1. Let ),( 211 aap  and ),( 212 aap  denote respectively firm 1’s and firm 2’s 
reduced-form profit functions derived based on the solution to the last stage of the game. Maximizing 1p  
with respect to 1a  and 2p  with respect to 2a  yield the two firms’ incentive parameter reaction 
functions, as given in the next lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: Firm 1’s incentive parameter reaction function in the delegation stage of the game is given by  
ï
î
ï
í
ì
-a
-a-
=a
1
c/)ac2(
)c4/()acc6(
122
1221
1     
)c2/()ca(if
)c2/()ca()c3/()c2a(if
)c3/()c2a(if
212
21221
212
+³a
+£a£+
+£a
   (7) 
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Firm 2’s incentive parameter reaction function (more precisely correspondence) in the delegation stage 
of the game is given by   
î
í
ì
¥a+
-a-
=a
)),c2/()ca[(
)c4/()acc6(
211
2112
2    
121
121
c/)ac2(if
c/)ac2(if
-£a
->a
     (8) 
 
 Firm 1’s incentive parameter reaction curve has three segments. The first line of (7) corresponds 
to a decreasing segment; the middle line of (7) corresponds to a rising segment (on which 
2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0); and the last line of (7) corresponds to a vertical segment. Regarding firm 2’s 
incentive parameter reaction map, it is important to observe that firm 2’s best response on or above the 
line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0 is not unique. This is because when 0c2ca 2211 £a-a+  firm 2’s profit is zero 
due to a zero output level. Note that above the line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0, 2211 c2ca a-a+  < 0. Below 
the line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0, firm 2’s best response is unique and decreasing in 1a . 
 The intersection of these reaction functions gives the firms’ equilibrium values for the incentive 
parameters as functions of their unit costs of production, as given by the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3: (a) If 21 c3c2a ³+ , there is a unique equilibrium in the delegation stage of the game, given 
by 
1
21
1 c5
ac2c8 --
=a ,    
2
12
2 c5
ac2c8 --
=a .      (9) 
(b) If 21 c3c2a <+ , there is a continuum of equilibria in the delegation stage of the game, given by the 
set: 
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E º  .}0c2ca;1
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ac2
};1,
c
ac2
min{
c3
ac4
:),{( 22112
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
21 =a-a+£a£
+-£a£-aa   
 
 It may be noted here that the choices of 1a  and 2a  as given by Lemma 3 satisfy the condition 
in Lemma 1 that 2211 cc a£a . First, consider the solution given by (9). From (9), 2211 cc a-a  = 
)cc(2 21 - , which is less than or equal to zero since 21 cc £ with or without licensing. Next, consider the 
set E. On this set, 2211 cc a-a  = )ca( 22a-- , which is less than  zero since 2ca >  by assumption and 
222 cc a³  in equilibrium.  
 The preceding results lead to the firms’ equilibrium quantity choices as functions of levels of 
marginal costs, as summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the quantity competition stage of the three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game, 
(a) if 21 c3c2a >+  then the equilibrium quantities are an interior solution, given by  
)c3c2a(
5
2
q 12
*
1 -+= ,   )c3c2a(5
2
q 21
*
2 -+= ;     (10) 
(b) if 21 c3c2a £+  then the following multiple corner solutions in quantity are obtained: 
)ca(
3
2
q}
2
ca
,camax{ 1
*
1
1
2 -££
-- ,   0q*2 = .     (11) 
 
 The interior solution given by (10) has the usual property that each firm’s output decreases in its 
own marginal cost but increases in its competitor’s unit cost. Comparing (10) with the well-known 
solution without delegation, given by ( 3/)c2ca(,3/)c2ca( 2112 -+-+ ), one obtains that industry 
 9 
output is higher under delegation. This confirms the established result that firms under delegation are 
more aggressive in their output choices than firms under no delegation.  
 Based on Proposition 1, the firms’ reduced-form profit functions are  
 )c,c( 21
*
1p  = 
2
21 )c2c3a(25
2 +- ,   )c,c( 21
*
2p  = 
2
12 )c2c3a(25
2 +-    (12) 
in the case of interior quantity solution, and  
 )c,c( 21
*
1p  = 
*
1
*
11 q)qca( -- ,   )c,c( 21
*
2p  = 0      (13) 
in the case of a corner quantity solution, where *1q  is given by (11). 
The Licensing Problem 
 In the licensing stage of our three stage game, the patent-holding firm (firm 1) first chooses a 
licensing contract, then the potential licensee (firm 2) decides whether to accept the offer from the patent 
holder. The patent-holding firm’s objective is to maximize its total income which is the sum of the profit 
from its own production and the licensing revenue. In the following analysis, we consider three forms of 
licensing contract: fixed fee only, royalty only, and fixed fee plus royalty.4 We use F to denote a fixed 
fee that is independent of the licensee’s output level and r to denote a royalty rate per unit of output.  
 Firm 1’s unit cost of production is 1c  = e-c , firm 2’s unit cost of production is 2c  = rc +e-  
when licensing occurs and is 2c  = c when licensing does not occur. Obviously, the royalty rate r cannot 
exceed the magnitude of innovation (e ). Firm 1 chooses a licensing contract to maximize its total 
income subject to the constraints that firm 2 is willing to accept the licensing contract and that firm 2’s 
output is non-negative. That is, firm 1 solves the following problem: 
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 Max{r, F} F)rc,c(qr)rc,c( *2
*
1 ++e-e-++e-e-p     (14) 
    s. t. 
   )c,c(F)rc,c( *2
*
2 e-p³-+e-e-p  
   0)rc,c(q*2 ³+e-e-  
In (14), the profit functions and firm 2’s output function are given by (10)-(13). Under fixed-fee 
licensing, firm 1 chooses F while restricting r to be zero; under royalty licensing, firm 1 chooses r while 
restricting F to be zero; under fee plus royalty licensing, firm 1 chooses both F and r. 
 The next proposition concerns the occurrence of licensing in the equilibrium of the three-stage 
game under each of the three forms of licensing.  
 
Proposition 2: The equilibrium outcome of the three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game is given 
by the following: 
(a) under fixed-fee licensing, licensing occurs if and only if e  < 2( ca - )/11;  
(b) under royalty licensing, licensing occurs if and only if e  < ( ca - )/2;  
(c) under fee plus royalty licensing, licensing occurs if and only if e  < ( ca - )/2 and will be in the 
form of royalty only when occurring. 
 
 It has been shown in the literature that, for the linear Cournot model without delegation, fixed-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 These three forms of licensing account for almost all licensing in practice. Rostoker (1984) reported that fixed fee 
alone was used thirteen percent of the time, royalty alone thirty-nine percent, and royalty plus fixed fee forty-six 
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fee licensing occurs for e  < 2( ca - )/3 and royalty licensing and fee plus royalty licensing occur for any 
non-drastic innovation (i.e., e  < ca - ).5 Comparing this conclusion with the results in Proposition 2, it 
follows that in the linear model licensing occurs at most half as likely under strategic delegation 
compared to no delegation. Moreover, licensing occurs only for small innovations under strategic 
delegation.6 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
 This paper has examined licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its 
competitor from the profit motive. Under strategic delegation, firms (managers) behave more 
aggressively than under standard quantity competition, reducing the incentive for the patent-holding firm 
to license its innovation to the other firm. This is the result of two forces. On the one hand, the cost-
reducing innovation (if kept for own use) affords the patent-holding firm a bigger advantage over its 
competitor under strategic delegation than under no delegation. On the other hand, the potential 
licensing revenue is smaller due to a smaller potential for profit gain from licensing by the competitor 
under strategic delegation than under no delegation. Both forces work to reduce the likelihood of 
licensing under strategic delegation relative to no delegation.  
 The discussion above also indicates that the main conclusion of this paper that licensing is less 
likely to occur under strategic delegation than under no delegation should survive extension of the simple 
homogenous good duopoly model with linear demand to more general settings.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
percent, among the firms surveyed. 
5 See, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Wang (1998). 
6 The conclusion in Proposition 2(c) extends the result in Wang (1998) and Kamien and Tauman (2002) that royalty is 
superior to fixed fee for the licensor to the situation with strategic delegation. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:   
 For the interior solution given by the first line of (5) and the first line of (6), it is obtained 
straightforwardly by solving for 1q  and 2q  using the first line of (3) and the first line of (4). This solution 
also gives us the condition to have an interior solution, namely 2q  is positive (which implies 1q  is 
positive). For the corner solution, it is important to recognize that under the condition 2211 cc a£a  the 
only possible corner solution is when the intersection point of the firms’ quantity reaction curves is on the 
1q  axis so that 2q  = 0. Using this fact, the corner solution for 1q  is obtained by substituting 2q  = 0 into 
the first line of (3) and is given by the second line of (5).  
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
 Based on (5) and (6), the firms’ reduced-form profit functions are  
ïî
ï
í
ì
--
---
=aap
c
1
c
11
i
1
i
2
i
11
211
q)qca(
q)qqca(
),(     
0c2caif
0c2caif
2211
2211
£a-a+
>a-a+
    (A1) 
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ï
í
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q)qqca(
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i
2
i
2
i
12
212  
0c2caif
0c2caif
2211
2211
£a-a+
>a-a+
    (A2) 
 Consider (7) first. Substituting i1q  and 
i
2q  given respectively by (5) and (6) into the first line of 
(A1) and maximizing the resulting profit function for firm 1 with respect to 1a  yield 1a  =  
)c4/()acc6( 1221 -a- , this is the first line of (7). For this solution to represent firm 1’s best reaction, the 
condition in the first line of (A1) must hold. The intersection of the lines 1a  =  )c4/()acc6( 1221 -a-  and 
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2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0 is ( 21 ,aa ) = ( )c3/()c2a(),c3/()ac4( 2111 +- ). Thus, the first line of (7) is proved. 
Substituting c1q  in (5) into the second line of (A1) and maximizing with respect to 1a  implies that 1a  = 
1. For this to hold, it must be true that 0c2ca 2211 £a-a+ . Replacing 1a  in this inequality by one gives 
)c2/()ca( 212 +³a . This proves the last line of (7). To show the middle line of (7), it suffices to 
observe that for the range of 2a  in the interval )]c2/()ca(),c3/()c2a[( 2121 ++  , firm 1 maximizes its 
profit function given by the second line of (A1) subject to the constraint that 0c2ca 2211 £a-a+ . For 
2a  Î )]c2/()ca(),c3/()c2a[( 2121 ++ , the above constraint is binding, yielding the middle line of (7). 
 Next consider (8). The first line of (8) is parallel to the first line of (7) and can be shown 
similarly by maximizing ),( 212 aap  in (A2). For the second line of (8), it suffices to observe that when 
0c2ca 2211 £a-a+  firm 2’s profit is zero implying an arbitrary choice of 2a  subject to the constraint 
that the above inequality holds, which implies that )c2/()ca( 2112 a+³a .   
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
 (a).  Solving the system of equations composed of the first line of (7) and the first line of (8) for 
1a  and 2a  gives immediately (9). From (9), 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 5/)c3c2a(6 21 -+ . Hence, if 
21 c3c2a >+  then 2211 c2ca a-a+  > 0 and if 21 c3c2a =+  then 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0. In either case, 
firm 1’s incentive parameter reaction curve given by (7) and firm 2’s incentive parameter reaction map 
given by (8) have a unique intersection point, that is given by (9). In the case 21 c3c2a >+ , this 
intersection point is below the line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0, while in the case 21 c3c2a =+ , it is right on the 
line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0. 
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 (b).  The proof for Part (a) indicates that if 21 c3c2a <+  then firm 1’s incentive parameter 
reaction curve given by (7) and firm 2’s incentive parameter reaction map given by (8) do not have an 
intersection point below the line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0. In this case they intersect on a line segment of the 
line 2211 c2ca a-a+  = 0. Straightforward derivations imply that this line segment corresponds to the set 
E.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
 (a).  Results in (10) follow immediately by substituting (9) into the first line of (5) and the first 
line of (6).  
 (b).  By Lemma 3(b), if 21 c3c2a <+  the delegation stage of the game results in choices of 
( 21 ,aa ) given by the set E. Using (6), it is obvious that on this set 0q 2 = . The range of 1q  is obtained 
by substituting 0q 2 =  and the range of values for 1a  in the set E into (3). In particular, corresponding 
to 1a  = )c3/()ac4( 11 -  we have 1q  = 3/)ca(2 1-  and corresponding to 1a  = 12 c/)ac2( -  or 1 we 
have 1q  = 2ca -  or 1q  = 2/)ca( 1- . These values for 1q  confirm the equilibrium range for 1q  in (11). 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
 (a).  Based on (10) and (12), both firms produce the quantity of 2( e+- ca )/5 and earn the 
profit of 2 2)ca( e+- /25 under fixed-fee licensing. If licensing does not occur, based on Lemma 3, an 
interior solution is obtained if e  < ( ca - )/2 and a corner solution is obtained if e  ³  ( ca - )/2.  
 Consider first the case of e  < ( ca - )/2. If licensing does not occur, by (12), firm 1’s profit is 
2 2)3ca( e+- /25 and firm 2’s profit is 2 2)2ca( e-- /25. The maximum licensing fee firm 1 can charge 
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firm 2 is equal to the difference between firm 2’s post-licensing profit and its profit if no licensing occurs. 
Thus, F = 2 2)ca( e+- / -25 2 2)2ca( e-- /25, and under fixed-fee licensing, firm 1’s total income is 
2 2)ca( e+- /25+F. The difference between this and firm 1’s profit under no licensing is 
2 2)ca( e+- /25 -+ F 2 2)3ca( e+- /25 = 2e [ e-- 11)ca(2 ]/25, which is greater than zero only for e  < 
2( ca - )/11. That is, under fixed-fee licensing and strategic delegation, licensing is profitable for firm 1 
for e  Î (0, 2( ca - )/11) but not profitable for e  Î (2( ca - )/11, ( ca - )/2). 
 Consider next the case of e  ³  ( ca - )/2. In this case firm 2 will produce zero output and make 
zero profit if licensing does not occur. Thus, the maximum fixed fee firm 1 can charge is equal to 
2 2)ca( e+- /25 and firm 1’s total income under licensing is 4 2)ca( e+- /25. If firm 1 does not license 
to firm 2, by (13), its profit is equal to *1
*
1 q)qca( -e+- , where by (11) 
*
1q  varies from ca -  to 
2( e+- ca )/3. It is straightforward to verify that *1
*
1 q)qca( -e+- > 4
2)ca( e+- /25 for all *1q  Î [ ca - , 
2( e+- ca )/3] when e  ³  ( ca - )/2. That is, under fixed-fee licensing and strategic delegation, licensing 
is not profitable for firm 1 for e  Î [( ca - )/2, ca - ). We have thus proved the assertion made in 
Proposition 2(a). 
 (b).  By using (10) and (12), firm 1’s total income under royalty licensing is  
 M = )rc,c(qr)rc,c( *2
*
1 +e-e-++e-e-p  = )r3ca(5
2
r)r2ca(
25
2 2 -e+-++e+- . 
Differentiating M with respect to r yields 
 )r22)ca(9(
25
2
r
M -e+-=
¶
¶ . 
Non-negative equilibrium output for firm 2 implies that e+-£ car3 . Hence, the feasible choice of r is 
from zero to min{e , ( e+- ca )/3}. It is easy to see that for r Î [0, min{e , ( e+- ca )/3}], r/M ¶¶ >0. 
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It follows that firm 1’s optimal choice of r is equal to min{e , ( e+- ca )/3}. The optimal r is equal to e  
if e  < ( ca - )/2. In this case, licensing occurs and firm 2 produces a positive output in equilibrium. The 
optimal r is equal to ( e+- ca )/3 if e  ³  ( ca - )/2. In this case, licensing does not occur since firm 2 
produces zero output in equilibrium. We have thus proved Proposition 2(b). 
 (c).  Obviously, the licensor’s optimal F is such that the first constraint in (14) holds in equality. 
Solving for F from this equality and substituting it into the objective function in (14), 
 M = )rc,c(qr)rc,c( *2
*
1 +e-e-++e-e-p + )c,c()rc,c(
*
2
*
2 e-p-+e-e-p . 
By using (10) and (12), 
 M = 222 )2ca(
25
2
)r3ca(
25
2
)r3ca(
5
2
r)r2ca(
25
2 e----e+-+-e+-++e+- . 
Differentiating M with respect to r yields 
 )r43)ca(3(
25
2
r
M -e+-=
¶
¶ > 0, 
where the inequality follows from the fact r £  e  < ca - . Namely, M is a strictly increasing function of r 
on the interval [0, e ] of feasible choices for r.  
 Two implications follow immediately from the fact that the best choice of royalty rate for the 
licensor is r = e . One, in the optimal fee plus royalty contract, the optimal fee is zero. This is because 
firm 2’s marginal cost of production is unchanged by licensing and therefore its profit is unchanged. 
Second, firm 2’s equilibrium output )c,c(q*2 e-  = 2( e-- 2ca )/5 is positive only for e  < 2/)ca( - . 
These two conclusions together establish the two statements in Proposition 2(c).  
 
 
